In TLSXEchChangeSNI, the ctx->extensions branch set extensions unconditionally even when TLSXFind returned NULL. This caused TLSXUseSNI to attach the attacker-controlled publicName to the shared WOLFSSLCTX when no inner SNI was configured. TLSXEchRestoreSNI then failed to clean it up because its removal was gated on serverNameX != NULL. The inner ClientHello was sized before the pollution but written after it, causing TLSXSNI_Write to memcpy 255 bytes past the allocation boundary.
{
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-787"
],
"osv_generated_from": "https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/5xxx/CVE-2026-5503.json",
"cna_assigner": "wolfSSL"
}{
"cpe": "cpe:2.3:a:wolfssl:wolfssl:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"extracted_events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"last_affected": "5.9.0"
}
],
"source": [
"AFFECTED_FIELD",
"CPE_RANGE"
]
}