fast-mcp-telegram is a Telegram MCP Server. Prior to version 30.1, the send_message/send_message_to_phone MCP tools accept files as a list of http(s) URLs, which the server downloads and attaches to the outgoing Telegram message. Downloads are guarded by _validate_url_security, an SSRF denylist that checks the URL's literal hostname string but never resolves DNS. The fetch (httpx.AsyncClient.get) does its own resolution at request time. Consequently a hostname that resolves to a loopback / private / link-local address passes the guard and is fetched — even with the secure defaults block_private_ips=True and allow_http_urls=False. Because the fetched body is returned to the attacker as a Telegram file attachment, this is a full-read, exfiltrating SSRF, not blind. This issue has been patched in version 30.1.
{
"cna_assigner": "GitHub_M",
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-184",
"CWE-918"
],
"osv_generated_from": "https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/55xxx/CVE-2026-55096.json",
"unresolved_ranges": [
{
"extracted_events": [
{
"range": [
{
"fixed": "30.1"
}
],
"source": "AFFECTED_FIELD",
"strategy": "StringRangeExpression"
}
]
},
{
"extracted_events": [
{
"range": [
{
"fixed": "30.1"
},
{
"fixed": "30.1"
}
],
"source": "DESCRIPTION"
}
]
}
]
}{
"extracted_events": [
{
"range": [
{
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}
],
"source": "REFERENCES_COMMIT"
},
{
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}