AIL did not restrict repeated failed attempts to verify a two-factor authentication (OTP) code. An attacker who had reached the 2FA verification step, such as after successfully completing the password-authentication stage, could submit an unlimited number of OTP guesses. This could enable brute-force guessing of a valid code and bypass the intended second authentication factor, resulting in unauthorized account access.
The patch introduces per-user failed-OTP tracking, blocks verification after 30 failed attempts for one hour, clears the counter after a successful OTP verification, and provides administrator recovery actions to purge affected lockouts.
{
"cna_assigner": "CIRCL",
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-307"
],
"osv_generated_from": "https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/56xxx/CVE-2026-56450.json",
"unresolved_ranges": [
{
"extracted_events": [
{
"range": [
{
"last_affected": "6.8.0"
}
],
"source": "AFFECTED_FIELD",
"strategy": "StandardRange"
}
]
}
]
}{
"extracted_events": [
{
"range": [
{
"fixed": "d3a394fe68fd5aeee86f3a3c91d4a0350f91e974"
}
],
"source": "REFERENCES_COMMIT"
}
]
}