PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. From version 4.5.126 to before version 4.6.59, PraisonAI's Async Jobs API validates webhook_url when a job request is parsed and again when the internal Job object is constructed. That validation blocks direct loopback/private targets, but it is not bound to the later network request. When a job completes, _send_webhook() passes the original hostname to httpx.AsyncClient.post() with no send-time validation, IP pinning, or guarded transport. An attacker-controlled hostname can therefore resolve to a public IP during Pydantic validation and later resolve to loopback/private/cloud-metadata infrastructure during webhook delivery. This bypasses the intended SSRF guard in current supported releases. This appears to be an incomplete fix / patch bypass for GHSA-8frj-8q3m-xhgm. This issue has been patched in version 4.6.59.
{
"cna_assigner": "GitHub_M",
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-367",
"CWE-918"
],
"osv_generated_from": "https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/57xxx/CVE-2026-57114.json"
}{
"extracted_events": [
{
"range": [
{
"introduced": "4.5.126"
},
{
"fixed": "4.6.59"
}
],
"source": "AFFECTED_FIELD",
"strategy": "StringRangeExpression"
},
{
"range": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "4.6.59"
}
],
"source": "DESCRIPTION"
}
]
}