Prowler is a cloud security platform. Prior to 5.30.3, Prowler's SAML authentication flow trusted the email domain asserted in a SAMLResponse when deciding which tenant should receive the final token, and the ACS finish logic in api/src/backend/api/v1/views.py recalculated the tenant from user.email instead of binding token issuance to the validated SAML configuration. An authenticated attacker with a controlled SAML IdP could complete a valid SAML flow for an attacker-controlled domain while asserting an email address from another configured domain, causing a SAMLToken and tenant-scoped JWT to be issued for the wrong tenant and enabling cross-tenant account takeover. This issue is fixed in version 5.30.3.
{
"cna_assigner": "GitHub_M",
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-287"
],
"osv_generated_from": "https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/59xxx/CVE-2026-59151.json"
}{
"extracted_events": [
{
"cpe": "cpe:2.3:a:prowler:prowler:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"range": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "5.30.3"
}
],
"source": "CPE_RANGE"
},
{
"range": [
{
"fixed": "bf3b5c2ba713e533014927141b64948c82c8f32e"
}
],
"source": "REFERENCES_COMMIT"
},
{
"range": [
{
"fixed": "f5ff30ad175bd2edf02cd28872653c1cda5867b7"
}
],
"source": "REFERENCES_COMMIT"
},
{
"original_tag": "5.30.3",
"range": [
{
"fixed": "0d00e29608491e75c9262a0e6a8022e419ac1d8a"
}
],
"source": "REFERENCES_TAG"
}
]
}