identrail is a machine identity security platform for AWS, GitHub/OIDC, and Kubernetes. Prior to 1.0.2, the default-on POST /v1/workspaces/:workspace_id/projects/:project_id/github/connect/complete endpoint in internal/api/router.go accepts installation_id from the request body or X-GitHub-Installation-ID header without verifying the installation belongs to the caller's workspace. CompleteGitHubConnection in internal/api/github_connect.go rigorously binds state to the caller's tenant, workspace, and project, but checks only that the installation ID is positive before persisting it as the caller's connection. ListInstallationRepositories in internal/connectors/github/repositories.go invokes token creation through internal/connectors/github/app.go and POST /app/installations/{installationId}/access_tokens, using the application's JWT. An authenticated tenant who starts a legitimate connection can supply another customer's non-secret installation ID to read the victim organization's private repository inventory, content, and metadata or drive posture scans, provided identrail's GitHub App is installed there. The default-off V2 CompleteGitHubConnector path shares the installation-ownership gap and additionally matches pending state without rechecking caller scope. This issue is fixed in version 1.0.2.
{
"cna_assigner": "GitHub_M",
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-639",
"CWE-862"
],
"osv_generated_from": "https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/59xxx/CVE-2026-59185.json"
}{
"extracted_events": [
{
"range": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.0.2"
}
],
"source": "AFFECTED_FIELD",
"strategy": "StringRangeExpression"
},
{
"range": [
{
"fixed": "835e40517509d6ef5405c27fbf14f579bedff0e7"
}
],
"source": "REFERENCES_COMMIT"
},
{
"original_tag": "v1.0.2",
"range": [
{
"fixed": "e7201d56e09ecc2c69505ae18a7b78f43f945d4c"
}
],
"source": "REFERENCES_TAG"
}
]
}