SOCFortress CoPilot focuses on providing a single pane of glass for all your security operations needs. Prior to 0.1.76, in the reported deployment, case-report templates uploaded by customer_user, the lowest-privilege portal role, are later executed by non-sandboxed Jinja2 engines when an admin or analyst generates a report. The /case-report-template/upload route in backend/app/incidents/routes/db_operations.py validates only the filename-derived MIME type, not the template content. Templates share a global store without customer_code scoping, and customer_user can also list, download and delete them, allowing an attacker to replace a legitimate default template under the same name. In backend/app/incidents/services/reports.py, render_document_with_context uses DocxTemplate without a sandbox; in backend/app/incidents/services/reports_pdf.py, render_html_template uses a non-sandboxed Environment without autoescaping. Normal privileged requests to POST /api/incidents/report/generate-report-docx or /generate-report-pdf therefore evaluate attacker-controlled Jinja expressions as Python on the backend. The reported deployment executes commands as root, exposing all tenants' incident and SIEM data and stored connector credentials. The HTML/PDF wkhtmltopdf renderer additionally permits local-file reads and requests to internal services. This issue is fixed in version 0.1.76.
{
"cna_assigner": "GitHub_M",
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-1336",
"CWE-862",
"CWE-94"
],
"osv_generated_from": "https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/61xxx/CVE-2026-61707.json"
}{
"extracted_events": [
{
"range": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.1.76"
}
],
"source": "AFFECTED_FIELD",
"strategy": "StringRangeExpression"
},
{
"range": [
{
"fixed": "a5ed4a250094d1b6d15ba0ec088dbd773ab1b4e0"
}
],
"source": "REFERENCES_COMMIT"
}
]
}