SOCFortress CoPilot focuses on providing a single pane of glass for all your security operations needs. Prior to 0.1.76, POST /api/agent_data_store/upload in backend/app/data_store/data_store_routes.py permits customer_user callers to choose bucket_name and object_name without an allowlist, tenant prefix, ownership check or content restriction. The only file check requires a nonempty filename. The operations in backend/app/data_store/data_store_operations.py create missing buckets and upsert objects, allowing existing objects belonging to any tenant to be overwritten. Targets include sysmon-configs/<customer_code>/sysmon_config.xml distributed to managed Windows endpoints, copilot-case-report-templates/<name> rendered server-side, and case evidence or forensic artifacts under copilot-cases/<case_id>/<file> and velociraptor-artifacts/<agent_id>/<flow_id>/<file>. A lowest-privilege user can tamper with cross-tenant evidence, blind endpoint telemetry, poison report templates for later code execution, plant data or exhaust storage. Sibling list, download and delete routes remain restricted to admin/analyst; the exposed operation is the upload write path. This issue is fixed in version 0.1.76.
{
"cna_assigner": "GitHub_M",
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-284",
"CWE-639",
"CWE-862"
],
"osv_generated_from": "https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/61xxx/CVE-2026-61708.json"
}{
"extracted_events": [
{
"range": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.1.76"
}
],
"source": "AFFECTED_FIELD",
"strategy": "StringRangeExpression"
},
{
"range": [
{
"fixed": "2d090bc07a109eefbdf9ed22dc67b0c93922d9ca"
}
],
"source": "REFERENCES_COMMIT"
}
]
}