In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
usb: gadget: f_fs: copy only received bytes on short ep0 read
ffsep0read() allocates its control-OUT data buffer with kmalloc() (not kzalloc) at the Length value from the Setup packet, then copies that full len to userspace regardless of how many bytes were actually received:
data = kmalloc(len, GFP_KERNEL);
...
ret = __ffs_ep0_queue_wait(ffs, data, len);
if ((ret > 0) && (copy_to_user(buf, data, len)))
ret = -EFAULT;
_ffsep0queuewait() returns req->actual, which on a short control OUT transfer is strictly less than len. The copytouser() call still copies len bytes, so on a short OUT the last (len - ret) bytes of the kmalloc() buffer -- uninitialised slab residue -- are delivered to the FunctionFS daemon.
Short ep0 OUT completions are specified USB control-transfer behavior and are produced by in-tree UDCs:
A short ep0 OUT is therefore not evidence of a broken UDC; it is a normal condition ffs has to cope with. The sibling gadgetfs implementation in drivers/usb/gadget/legacy/inode.c already does this correctly via min(len, dev->req->actual) before copytouser(). This patch brings ffs.c to the same safe pattern rather than trimming at a defensive layer.
The bug is reached from the FunctionFS device node, which in real deployments is owned by the privileged gadget daemon (adbd, UMS, composite gadget services, etc.); it is not reachable from unprivileged userspace. Linux host stacks normally reject short-wLength control OUTs before they reach the gadget, so reproducing this required a build that bypasses that host-side check. With the bypass in place, a 1-byte payload on a 64-byte Setup produces 63 bytes of non-canary slab residue in the daemon's read buffer.
Fix by copying only ret (actually received) bytes to userspace.
{
"osv_generated_from": "https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/63xxx/CVE-2026-63895.json",
"cna_assigner": "Linux"
}