In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: tls: prevent chain-after-chain in plain text SG
Sashiko points out that if end = 0 (start != 0) the current code will create a chain link to content type right after the wrap link:
This would create a chain where the wrap link points directly to another chain link. The scatterlist API sg_next iterator does not recursively resolve consecutive chain links.
meaning this is illegal input to crypto.
The wrapping link is unnecessary if end = 0. end is the entry after the last one used so end = 0 means there's nothing pushed after the wrap:
end start i v v v [ ]...[ ][ d ][ d ][ d ][ d ][rsv for wrap]
Skip the wrapping in this case.
TLS 1.3 can use the "wrapping slot" for it's chaining if end = 0. This avoids the chain-after-chain.
Move the wrap chaining before marking END and chaining off content type, that feels like more logical ordering to me, but should not matter from functional perspective.
{
"osv_generated_from": "https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/64xxx/CVE-2026-64046.json",
"cna_assigner": "Linux"
}