In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
udf: validate sparing table length as an entry count, not a byte count
udfloadsparable_map() accepts a sparing table when
sizeof(*st) + le16_to_cpu(st->reallocationTableLen) > sb->s_blocksize
is false, i.e. it treats reallocationTableLen as a number of BYTES that must fit in the block. But the table is walked as an array of 8-byte sparingEntry elements:
for (i = 0; i < le16_to_cpu(st->reallocationTableLen); i++) {
struct sparingEntry *entry = &st->mapEntry[i];
... entry->origLocation ...
}
in udfgetpblockspar15() and udfrelocateblocks(). A reallocationTableLen of N therefore passes the check whenever sizeof(*st) + N <= blocksize, yet the consumers index sizeof(*st) + N * sizeof(struct sparingEntry) bytes -- up to ~8x the block. On a crafted UDF image this is an out-of-bounds read in udfgetpblockspar15(); udfrelocateblocks() additionally feeds the same length to udfupdatetag(), whose crcitut() reads far past the block, and its memmove() through st->mapEntry[] is an out-of-bounds write.
Validate reallocationTableLen as the entry count it is, with struct_size().
{
"cna_assigner": "Linux",
"osv_generated_from": "https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/64xxx/CVE-2026-64322.json"
}