CVE-2026-64549

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

Bluetooth: bpa10x: avoid OOB read of revision string in bpa10x_setup()

bpa10xsetup() sends the vendor command 0xfc0e and passes the response to btdevinfo() and hcisetfwinfo() as a "%s" string starting at skb->data + 1, without checking the length:

bt_dev_info(hdev, "%s", (char *)(skb->data + 1));
hci_set_fw_info(hdev, "%s", skb->data + 1);

A device that returns a one-byte response (status only) leaves skb->data + 1 past the end of the data, and the %s walk reads adjacent slab memory until it meets a NUL. The same happens when the payload is not NUL-terminated within skb->len. The out-of-bounds bytes end up in the kernel log and the firmware-info debugfs file.

Print the revision string with a bounded "%.*s" limited to skb->len - 1 instead. This keeps the string readable for well-behaved devices while never reading past the received data, and does not fail setup, so a device returning a short or unterminated response keeps working.