FreeRDP before 3.28.0 (affected <=3.27.1) contains a heap-based buffer overflow in cryptorsacommon() (libfreerdp/crypto/crypto.c). The function writes the modular-exponentiation result into the caller's output buffer via BNbn2bin() and only afterward checks outputlength > out_length, so out-of-bounds bytes are written before the bounds check. On the server side, when a client selects RDP Standard Security, the encrypted client random is decrypted into a fixed 32-byte buffer. Because the server publishes its RSA public key, an unauthenticated attacker can forge a ciphertext whose decrypted value is up to the full modulus length (e.g. 256 bytes for RSA-2048), overflowing the 32-byte heap buffer by up to ~224 attacker-controlled bytes pre-authentication, resulting in denial of service.
{
"osv_generated_from": "https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/64xxx/CVE-2026-64620.json",
"cna_assigner": "VulnCheck",
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-122"
]
}