The pure-Erlang AES-GCM fallback in jose_jwa_aes derives the number of verified authentication tag bits from the attacker-supplied tag itself. In the {aes_gcm, Bits} clause of block_decrypt/4, the incoming tag is guarded only by is_binary/1, with no check on its length. Verification in gcm_block_decrypt/6 then computes TBits = bit_size(T) and compares only those bits of the real 128-bit tag. An attacker who controls a JWE token can truncate the authentication tag to as little as 8 bits, so only 8 bits are ever checked. This reduces forgery resistance from 2^-128 to 2^-8, and a forged ciphertext is reliably accepted as authentic within 256 attempts without knowledge of the key (an authentication tag forgery and integrity bypass). Supplying a tag longer than 128 bits instead causes a badmatch that crashes the decrypting process. The fallback is reached through the public JWE decryption path whenever AES-GCM is not provided by a native crypto NIF, for example on FIPS or stripped or older OTP builds.
This issue affects jose: from 1.2.0 before 1.11.13.
{
"cna_assigner": "EEF",
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-354"
],
"osv_generated_from": "https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/65xxx/CVE-2026-65625.json"
}{
"extracted_events": [
{
"range": [
{
"introduced": "8848b172575fb7d7e1e2977e8ae0a21678d2157a"
},
{
"fixed": "3fa1f8e3efda0da5ce6f4c9984789f979dc02740"
}
],
"source": "AFFECTED_FIELD",
"strategy": "StandardRange"
},
{
"range": [
{
"introduced": "1.2.0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.11.13"
}
],
"source": "AFFECTED_FIELD",
"strategy": "StandardRange"
},
{
"range": [
{
"fixed": "8848b172575fb7d7e1e2977e8ae0a21678d2157a"
}
],
"source": "REFERENCES_COMMIT"
},
{
"range": [
{
"fixed": "3fa1f8e3efda0da5ce6f4c9984789f979dc02740"
}
],
"source": "REFERENCES_COMMIT"
}
]
}