ideon is a self-hosted visual workspace. Prior to version 0.9.4, validateUrlForSSRF() / safeFetch() in lib/oauth/ssrf-protection.ts (and the parallel validateMcpUrl() in lib/security/validators.ts) perform SSRF host-blocking by string/regex matching on new URL(url).hostname. Their IPv6 branch only recognises the textual forms ::1, fe80:/fc00:/fd00: prefixes, and the dotted-decimal IPv4-mapped form ::ffff:127.x. It does not recognise the WHATWG-canonical IPv4-mapped-IPv6 host that Node emits for a mapped address, which is hex-compressed and bracket-wrapped: [::ffff:7f00:1] for 127.0.0.1, [::ffff:a9fe:a9fe] for 169.254.169.254. An authenticated user who registers a STREAMABLE_HTTP / SSE MCP server with URL http://[::ffff:7f00:1]:PORT/ (loopback) or http://[::ffff:a9fe:a9fe]/ (cloud metadata) passes both guards, and the server-side OAuth-discovery action then fetches that host, yielding server-side request forgery to loopback and to the cloud metadata service. This issue has been patched in version 0.9.4.
{
"cna_assigner": "GitHub_M",
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-918"
],
"osv_generated_from": "https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/65xxx/CVE-2026-65968.json"
}{
"extracted_events": [
{
"range": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.9.4"
}
],
"source": "AFFECTED_FIELD",
"strategy": "StringRangeExpression"
},
{
"range": [
{
"fixed": "58e2f26bb7259d24c963a753962ac34f56c63b01"
}
],
"source": "REFERENCES_COMMIT"
},
{
"original_tag": "v0.9.4",
"range": [
{
"fixed": "63cc5c1a886fc6408ac56979f136177cea060b48"
}
],
"source": "REFERENCES_TAG"
}
]
}