RabbitMQ is a messaging and streaming broker. From 3.13.0 until 3.13.15 and 4.0.22 and 4.1.11 and 4.2.6 and 4.3.1, Atom exhaustion: OAuth2 JWT tag: scope values. extractscopes/1 parses scopes of the form .tag: and calls rabbitdatacoercion:toatom() to convert to a tag atom. The token signature is verified first, so the attacker cannot forge scopes , but in IdP configurations where scope content is user-influenced, each login with a novel tag value leaks one In deployments where users can influence the scopes included in their IdP-issued JWT rabbitmqauthbackendoauth2 enabled IdP permits attacker-influenced scope values in signed tokens. This issue is fixed in versions 3.13.15 and 4.0.22 and 4.1.11 and 4.2.6 and 4.3.1.
{
"cna_assigner": "GitHub_M",
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-400"
],
"osv_generated_from": "https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/66xxx/CVE-2026-66071.json",
"unresolved_ranges": [
{
"extracted_events": [
{
"introduced": "3.13.0"
},
{
"fixed": "3.13.15"
},
{
"introduced": "4.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "4.0.22"
},
{
"introduced": "4.1.0"
},
{
"fixed": "4.1.11"
}
],
"source": "AFFECTED_FIELD"
}
]
}