Heym builds and runs agentic systems and business-process automations on self-hosted infrastructure. Prior to version 0.0.75, the same POST /api/mcp/fetch-tools endpoint (any authenticated user, lowest role) also accepts the stdio transport, which spawns the attacker-supplied command with attacker-supplied args and an environment merged over os.environ. The process executes on the shared backend host before MCP protocol validation fails — so side effects fire regardless of whether the command speaks MCP. This is a distinct weakness class and exploit primitive from the SSRF (Advisory 2) on the same endpoint, and needs a different fix (role gating / opt-in trust boundary rather than egress controls). This issue has been patched in version 0.0.75.
{
"cna_assigner": "GitHub_M",
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-94"
],
"osv_generated_from": "https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/67xxx/CVE-2026-67546.json"
}{
"extracted_events": [
{
"range": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.0.75"
}
],
"source": "AFFECTED_FIELD",
"strategy": "StringRangeExpression"
},
{
"range": [
{
"fixed": "22b8ee60eb92128cf4ff04a9b6c0e1b62bf25a01"
}
],
"source": "REFERENCES_COMMIT"
},
{
"range": [
{
"fixed": "6c6213f88dfa8b2a70d23a9a271171241e910904"
}
],
"source": "REFERENCES_COMMIT"
},
{
"original_tag": "v0.0.75",
"range": [
{
"fixed": "6c6213f88dfa8b2a70d23a9a271171241e910904"
}
],
"source": "REFERENCES_TAG"
}
]
}