When django-filer's optional per-folder permission system is enabled (FILER_ENABLE_PERMISSIONS=True), the "Delete files and/or folders" admin action does not enforce per-folder edit permissions the way every other mutating action does. A staff user who is scoped read-only on a folder via FolderPermission (can_edit = DENY), but who holds the global Django model-level delete_* permission, can delete files and entire subfolders inside that folder — even though their move, rename, copy, and resize actions on the same folder are correctly denied.
This is an integrity / edit-control gap (unauthorized deletion). It is not a read-confidentiality issue: filer files are world-downloadable by design, so no confidentiality claim is made.
<= 3.4.4 (verified end-to-end on 3.4.4 and on master prior to the fix).Only installations running with FILER_ENABLE_PERMISSIONS = True (the optional per-folder FolderPermission system) are affected. Deployments that leave permissions disabled (the default) rely solely on Django model-level permissions and are not impacted by this specific gap.
3.5.0 or later).The delete_files_or_folders admin action in filer/admin/folderadmin.py authorized deletion using only:
self.has_delete_permission(request) — which returns True for obj=None, anddelete_file / delete_folder / delete_image permission (enforced downstream by the admin delete machinery).It never called check_folder_edit_permissions or check_files_edit_permissions. Every sibling mutating action — move, rename, copy, resize — does call these helpers, which walk the selected objects (and their descendants) and enforce the per-folder can_edit grant from FolderPermission.
Because FolderPermission has no dedicated can_delete field, deletion is treated as an edit/management operation and is gated elsewhere on can_edit. The delete action's omission therefore let a folder-scoped read-only user bypass the per-folder control that constrains all their other write operations.
The attacker must hold the Django model-level delete_file / delete_folder / delete_image permission. A purely read-only user (no model-level delete perm) receives 403 and cannot exploit this. This precondition matches the standard folder-scoped-staff deployment model, where staff hold model-level permissions and are further constrained per-folder by FolderPermission.
delete_file /
delete_folder / delete_image permission to staff who are meant to be
read-only on specific folders via FolderPermission.Reported through coordinated disclosure. Fixed in PR #1605.
{
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-285",
"CWE-639",
"CWE-862"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-11-18T21:20:42Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "MODERATE"
}