Gitea validates a repository migration hostname against its network allow and block lists before invoking Git, but the Git subprocess independently resolves the hostname when connecting. An attacker who can start a migration and control the destination's DNS can change the address between validation and connection to reach a blocked internal address. The affected path is the Git clone operation; validation in the migration HTTP client's dialer does not protect the independently connecting Git subprocess.
{
"cna_assigner": "Gitea",
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-918"
],
"osv_generated_from": "https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/70xxx/CVE-2026-70357.json"
}{
"extracted_events": [
{
"cpe": "cpe:2.3:a:gitea:gitea:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"range": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "28.0.0"
}
],
"source": "CPE_RANGE"
},
{
"original_tag": "v28.0.0",
"range": [
{
"fixed": "15b8a5805adf57c5189602008d38cccfd3c795e0"
}
],
"source": "REFERENCES_TAG"
}
]
}