Banks generates meaningful LLM prompts using a simple template language. Prior to version 2.4.5, DirectoryPromptRegistry.set() in src/banks/registries/directory.py interpolates attacker-controlled Prompt.name and Prompt.version values into a Path without canonicalization or containment validation. Relative traversal such as ../victim/foo and an absolute Prompt.name can escape or discard the configured registry root, while overwrite=True permits replacement of existing target files. The poisoned name is persisted in index.json and reconstructed by _load(), allowing the out-of-root path to survive later registry loads. An application that forwards request data into these fields can therefore write Prompt.raw bytes to attacker-chosen paths writable by the application process. This issue is fixed in version 2.4.5.
{
"cna_assigner": "GitHub_M",
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"osv_generated_from": "https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/71xxx/CVE-2026-71492.json"
}{
"extracted_events": [
{
"range": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.4.5"
}
],
"source": "AFFECTED_FIELD",
"strategy": "StringRangeExpression"
},
{
"range": [
{
"fixed": "a215f6d779966945c56e0af5abed1ae5916fd9d3"
}
],
"source": "REFERENCES_COMMIT"
},
{
"original_tag": "v2.4.5",
"range": [
{
"fixed": "ae351d7716451cda07a466646e8bb6556fe600a8"
}
],
"source": "REFERENCES_TAG"
}
]
}