In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ASoC: SOF: topology: validate vendor array size before parsing
sofparsetoken_sets() reads array->size while iterating over topology private data. The loop condition only checks that some data remains, so a malformed topology with a truncated trailing vendor array can make the parser read the size field before a full vendor-array header is available.
Validate that the remaining private data contains a complete sndsoctplgvendorarray header before reading array->size.
The declared array size check also needs to remain signed. asize is an int, but sizeof(*array) has type size_t, so comparing them directly promotes negative asize values to unsigned and lets them pass the check, as reported in the stable review thread reference below.
Cast sizeof(*array) to int when validating the declared array size. This rejects negative, zero and otherwise too-small sizes before the parser dispatches to the tuple-specific code.
{
"osv_generated_from": "https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/72xxx/CVE-2026-72300.json",
"cna_assigner": "Linux"
}