In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
smb: client: fix overflow in passthrough ioctl bounds check
smb2ioctlqueryinfo() validates the PASSTHRUFSCTL response payload before copying it to userspace.
The payload offset and length both come from 32-bit fields. The bounds check currently adds OutputOffset and qi.inputbufferlength directly, so the addition can wrap in 32-bit arithmetic before the result is compared against the response buffer length.
A malicious server can use a large OutputOffset and a small OutputCount to make the wrapped sum pass the bounds check. The later copytouser() then reads from io_rsp + OutputOffset, outside the response buffer.
Use size_add() for the offset plus length check so overflow is treated as out of bounds.
{
"osv_generated_from": "https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/72xxx/CVE-2026-72310.json",
"cna_assigner": "Linux"
}