The webhook URL validator in website/notifications/webhooks.py uses
ip.is_global to reject non-public addresses after DNS resolution. IPv6
transition addresses (NAT64 64:ff9b::/96, 6to4 2002::/16, Teredo
2001:0000::/32) are classified as globally routable by IANA, so is_global
returns True even when the embedded IPv4 targets a private, loopback, or
cloud metadata destination. An attacker can register a webhook pointing at a
hostname that resolves to a transition address to bypass the SSRF guard and
exfiltrate vulnerability data to an internal endpoint.
The vulnerability was introduced on a non-release version. The fix was already done on HEAD. It only affects
organisation running the HEAD.
{
"cna_assigner": "CIRCL",
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-918"
],
"osv_generated_from": "https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/72xxx/CVE-2026-72761.json"
}