Time-of-check Time-of-use (TOCTOU) Race Condition in ZenHive mpp allows an unauthenticated remote client to redeem one confirmed on-chain payment for multiple paid-resource accesses.
The type="hash" credential path in MPP.Methods.Tempo.verify/2 guards against replay with a non-atomic check-then-mark sequence: check_hash_unused/2 reads the dedup store, an eth_getTransactionReceipt round trip verifies the payment on chain, and only then does mark_hash_used/2 write the mark. Concurrent requests carrying the same settled payment hash all pass the read before any of them writes, so each is issued a receipt. The store's atomic check_and_mark/2 primitive is available and used by the type="transaction" path, but the hash path calls plain get and put even when the configured store implements it. Exploitation requires a dedup store to be configured; the default nil store is stateless and documented as offering no replay protection at all.
This issue affects mpp: from 0.2.0 before 0.6.1.
{
"cna_assigner": "EEF",
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-367"
],
"osv_generated_from": "https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/73xxx/CVE-2026-73829.json"
}{
"extracted_events": [
{
"cpe": "cpe:2.3:a:zenhive:machine_payments_protocol:*:*:*:*:*:elixir:*:*",
"range": [
{
"introduced": "0.2.0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.6.1"
}
],
"source": "CPE_RANGE"
},
{
"range": [
{
"fixed": "46c5b0e1311da7d92190dc7d9ea89027a1d365e9"
}
],
"source": "REFERENCES_COMMIT"
}
]
}