Time-of-check Time-of-use (TOCTOU) Race Condition in ZenHive mpp allows an unauthenticated remote client to redeem one confirmed on-chain payment for multiple paid-resource accesses.
The type="hash" credential path in MPP.Methods.Tempo.verify/2 guards against replay with a non-atomic check-then-mark sequence: checkhashunused/2 reads the dedup store, an ethgetTransactionReceipt round trip verifies the payment on chain, and only then does markhashused/2 write the mark. Concurrent requests carrying the same settled payment hash all pass the read before any of them writes, so each is issued a receipt. The store's atomic checkand_mark/2 primitive is available and used by the type="transaction" path, but the hash path calls plain get and put even when the configured store implements it. Exploitation requires a dedup store to be configured; the default nil store is stateless and documented as offering no replay protection at all.
This issue affects mpp: from 0.2.0 before 0.6.1.
{
"unresolved_ranges": [
{
"extracted_events": [
{
"introduced": "f8904666061fbab695874856d8fcd02c471dfe1b"
},
{
"fixed": "46c5b0e1311da7d92190dc7d9ea89027a1d365e9"
}
],
"source": "AFFECTED_FIELD"
}
],
"cna_assigner": "EEF",
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-367"
],
"osv_generated_from": "https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/73xxx/CVE-2026-73829.json"
}