Reliance on Cookies without Validation and Integrity Checking vulnerability in ash-project ash_admin lets an attacker who controls a sibling subdomain rebind an admin's session to a different actor, tenant, or authorization mode.
AshAdmin's client JavaScript read its state cookies (tenant, actorresource, actorprimarykey, actoraction, actordomain, actorauthorizing, actorpaused) by matching the cookie name with an unanchored regular expression (new RegExp(name + "=([^;]+)")) against the whole document.cookie. Any cookie whose name merely ends with the requested name therefore matches, and whichever is serialized first wins. Because cookies are shared across a registrable domain, a compromised sibling subdomain can set a shadowing cookie (for example xactorauthorizing) with Domain=.example.com that flows unvalidated into the admin's LiveSocket connect params. The fix matches cookie names by exact equality.
This issue affects ash_admin: from 0.9.1 before 1.3.1.
{
"osv_generated_from": "https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/75xxx/CVE-2026-75757.json",
"unresolved_ranges": [
{
"source": "AFFECTED_FIELD",
"extracted_events": [
{
"introduced": "77a43cc4fa04cb59c38fc434568a35a38ecb995a"
},
{
"fixed": "e93a3408a85035e1f90275d02bc2470c96095e56"
}
]
}
],
"cna_assigner": "EEF",
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-565"
]
}