Improper Control of Generation of Code (Code Injection) vulnerability in ash-project ash_ai allows a remote, unauthenticated client to execute arbitrary Elixir code.
AshAi.Actions.Prompt evaluates prompt content through EEx.eval_string/2. The documented prompt: fn input, context -> ... end form lets the prompt content be built from action arguments, so when a prompt action's text incorporates request data, that attacker-controlled text is compiled and run as an EEx template (Elixir source). Content such as <%= System.cmd(...) %> therefore executes on the server before any model request is made, requiring no authentication beyond reaching a prompt action. The fix stops evaluating function-supplied prompt content as EEx; only statically configured templates are evaluated.
This issue affects ash_ai: from 0.1.0 before 1.0.0.
{
"osv_generated_from": "https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/77xxx/CVE-2026-77956.json",
"unresolved_ranges": [
{
"source": "AFFECTED_FIELD",
"extracted_events": [
{
"introduced": "4aab131d40a0bd5a8cf0b3c4eaaa59d49565f3d1"
},
{
"fixed": "e9948254b5659c1143b73dc2f59f457931e64514"
}
]
}
],
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-94"
],
"cna_assigner": "EEF"
}