The RTIO streaming completion callback adxl345_process_fifo_samples_cb() in drivers/sensor/adi/adxl345/adxl345_stream.c clamps the amount of FIFO data it will report (read_len = MIN(fifo_bytes, buf_avail)) to the space actually returned by rtio_sqe_rx_buf(), but then queues one 6-byte bus read per hardware FIFO entry at consecutive offsets from read_buf, bounded by the device-reported entry count rather than by the clamp. When the allocated buffer is smaller than a full batch, the driver writes up to 186 bytes past the end of the allocation; a companion defect left data->fifo_total_bytes un-reset at batch start, so an aborted or errored chain could leave a stale write offset that pushes the next batch's writes out of bounds as well.
A short buffer is an expected, first-class outcome of the RTIO allocator: rtio_block_pool_alloc() walks the requested size down one block at a time until a contiguous run is available, and the driver only demands sizeof(struct adxl345_fifo_data) + 6 bytes as its minimum. Any streaming configuration whose mempool block granularity is smaller than a full FIFO batch (204 bytes) — for example the sensor shell's RTIO_DEFINE_WITH_MEMPOOL(sensor_read_rtio, 8, 8, 32, 64, 4) used by sensor stream on fifo_wm incl, or the 16-byte-block streaming example in the documentation — takes this path whenever the pool is fragmented or the consuming thread falls behind.
The out-of-bounds writes are performed by the I2C/SPI RTIO backend (DMA on many SoCs) into the shared RTIO block pool, corrupting neighbouring live buffers or, for a pool smaller than one batch, memory beyond the pool itself. The written bytes are accelerometer samples and the destination follows the allocation, so there is no controllable corruption primitive: the realistic impact is silent corruption of other RTIO consumers' data or a crash. Reaching it requires a board with an interrupt-wired ADXL345 built with CONFIG_ADXL345_STREAM, plus buffer-pool starvation, which a co-resident local workload can induce but which also occurs spontaneously under load; there is no network, USB or radio path to this code.
{
"cna_assigner": "zephyr",
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-787"
],
"osv_generated_from": "https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/79xxx/CVE-2026-79978.json"
}{
"extracted_events": [
{
"range": [
{
"introduced": "4.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "4.3.2"
}
],
"source": "AFFECTED_FIELD",
"strategy": "StandardRange"
},
{
"range": [
{
"introduced": "4.4.0"
},
{
"fixed": "4.5.0"
}
],
"source": "AFFECTED_FIELD",
"strategy": "StandardRange"
},
{
"range": [
{
"fixed": "3451bb1e1e9165844060551164adb8a756e7b6b7"
}
],
"source": "REFERENCES_COMMIT"
}
]
}
"https://storage.googleapis.com/cve-osv-conversion/osv-output/CVE-2026-79978.json"
[
{
"deprecated": false,
"digest": {
"function_hash": "136039084415628676009503826953460876122",
"length": 2656
},
"id": "CVE-2026-79978-72569835",
"signature_type": "Function",
"signature_version": "v1",
"source": "https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/commit/3451bb1e1e9165844060551164adb8a756e7b6b7",
"target": {
"file": "drivers/sensor/adi/adxl345/adxl345_stream.c",
"function": "adxl345_process_fifo_samples_cb"
}
},
{
"deprecated": false,
"digest": {
"line_hashes": [
"107905652093991558130355535114218593792",
"183944381604192674257233682827544617315",
"283321273760218793708546203948070567320",
"150946543435803609601231565172177076848",
"33267144374134998233559451923695078094",
"275789192585532419045033666767323660721",
"183483054001383008744327914311700154858",
"44887908385466475890360150858924503457",
"245853886242863919716608781652570500566",
"120768829781178422625307480594076252227",
"149366681241557333421590014731201932667",
"201617782681051514351183107263394531712"
],
"threshold": 0.9
},
"id": "CVE-2026-79978-d75e3153",
"signature_type": "Line",
"signature_version": "v1",
"source": "https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/commit/3451bb1e1e9165844060551164adb8a756e7b6b7",
"target": {
"file": "drivers/sensor/adi/adxl345/adxl345_stream.c"
}
}
]
"2026-11-05T13:08:40Z"