The Bluetooth HCI USB transport class of the new USB device stack, subsys/usb/device_next/class/bt_hci.c, copies every controller-to-host HCI packet into a USB transfer buffer before enqueuing it on an endpoint. bt_hci_tx_sync_in() allocated that buffer from bt_hci_ep_pool, a fixed pool whose slots are only USBD_MAX_BULK_MPS bytes (64 on full-speed-only builds), and then performed net_buf_add_mem(buf, bt_buf->data, bt_buf->len) with no length check. HCI event and ACL buffers are sized by CONFIG_BT_BUF_EVT_RX_SIZE and CONFIG_BT_BUF_ACL_RX_SIZE and can be far larger, so the copy runs past the end of the 64-byte slot into the adjacent slots and into whatever follows the statically allocated pool.
The device runs the local Bluetooth controller in raw HCI mode (CONFIG_BT_HCI_RAW), so the oversized packets originate over the air. With the HCI buffer sizes recommended for full-featured controllers, an unauthenticated attacker within Bluetooth range can supply the overflowing bytes: a connected peer that negotiates Data Length Extension can send ACL fragments up to CONFIG_BT_CTLR_DATA_LENGTH_MAX bytes, and an attacker that merely broadcasts extended advertising data reaches the same path through LE Extended Advertising Report events, which the controller fragments only to CONFIG_BT_BUF_EVT_RX_SIZE. In the stock configuration the overflow is already reached without any radio traffic: the mandatory Read Supported Commands command-complete event is 70 bytes and overruns the 64-byte slot by six bytes on every host initialization.
Because net_buf_add_mem() validates tailroom only through an assertion unless CONFIG_NET_BUF_HARDENING is enabled, builds with CONFIG_ASSERT=n — the usual production setting — silently corrupt memory adjacent to the USB buffer pool with attacker-chosen contents, which on a target without memory protection between subsystems can lead to arbitrary code execution. Builds with assertions enabled fail the assertion instead and panic, giving a remotely triggerable denial of service. The fix introduces a separate bt_hci_tx_pool sized to MAX(BT_BUF_ACL_RX_SIZE, BT_BUF_EVT_RX_SIZE) for the controller-to-host direction while leaving the host-to-device pool at the endpoint packet size, which is already bounds-checked during reassembly.
{
"cna_assigner": "zephyr",
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-787"
],
"osv_generated_from": "https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/79xxx/CVE-2026-79982.json"
}{
"extracted_events": [
{
"range": [
{
"introduced": "3.3.0"
},
{
"fixed": "4.3.2"
}
],
"source": "AFFECTED_FIELD",
"strategy": "StandardRange"
},
{
"range": [
{
"introduced": "4.4.0"
},
{
"fixed": "4.5.0"
}
],
"source": "AFFECTED_FIELD",
"strategy": "StandardRange"
},
{
"range": [
{
"fixed": "0419defd2391652edc27689d206fcd9c48439d4a"
}
],
"source": "REFERENCES_COMMIT"
}
]
}
"https://storage.googleapis.com/cve-osv-conversion/osv-output/CVE-2026-79982.json"
[
{
"deprecated": false,
"digest": {
"line_hashes": [
"270141513897290598536317698216927553307",
"71573172233366789006639465512567604424",
"171802120896063059238414023103787989452",
"68882491643131598813313075731285745461",
"8147754703596287397225829953618096227",
"140687221762693064638125276097029124188",
"293768067043755720603328409832852791288",
"90257412149798701634912115789818132598",
"108912865172136665009539561265869883119",
"207615469592967829869963837923928529602",
"329079253981781155825919237862093699003",
"339027496908679915400045493692826133951",
"43817714286379705425603463867071829323",
"22360847348086078846609103868513529500"
],
"threshold": 0.9
},
"id": "CVE-2026-79982-6db550c3",
"signature_type": "Line",
"signature_version": "v1",
"source": "https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/commit/0419defd2391652edc27689d206fcd9c48439d4a",
"target": {
"file": "subsys/usb/device_next/class/bt_hci.c"
}
}
]
"2026-11-05T13:08:40Z"