In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
crypto: qce - fix CCM AAD buffer underallocation
The AAD buffer allocated in qceaeadccmpreparebuf_assoclen() can be smaller than the length later programmed into the DMA scatterlist.
The allocation size is currently calculated as:
ALIGN(assoclen, 16) + MAXCCMADATAHEADERLEN
while the DMA length is set to:
ALIGN(assoclen + adataheaderlen, 16)
Since ALIGN() does not distribute over addition, the allocation can be smaller than the DMA length. For example, when assoclen = 32 and adataheaderlen = 2:
allocation = ALIGN(32, 16) + 6 = 38 DMA length = ALIGN(32 + 2, 16) = 48
As a result, the QCE hardware can read beyond the allocated buffer while computing the CBC-MAC over the associated data. The extra bytes are folded into the authentication tag, resulting in an incorrect tag and causing CCM self-test failures such as:
alg: aead: ccm-aes-qce encryption test failed (wrong result) on test vector 8
Fix the allocation by adding the maximum possible AAD header length before alignment:
ALIGN(assoclen + MAXCCMADATAHEADERLEN, 16)
This guarantees that the allocated buffer is large enough for the fully padded AAD data for all supported header sizes.
{
"cna_assigner": "Linux",
"osv_generated_from": "https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/80xxx/CVE-2026-80832.json"
}