In wolfSSH through 1.5.0 built with --enable-fwd, DoChannelOpen() in src/internal.c gates only direct-tcpip channel opens with the forwarding policy callback. forwarded-tcpip opens are admitted without an authorization check and are not capped in number, allowing a malicious SSH peer to make an endpoint allocate unbounded per-channel buffers for forwarding channels the application never authorized. A client also does not check a forwarded-tcpip open against the forwards it registered with a tcpip-forward request, as RFC 4254 section 7.2 requires, so a malicious server can open forwarding channels for addresses and ports the client never asked it to forward.
{
"cna_assigner": "wolfSSL",
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-862",
"CWE-863"
],
"osv_generated_from": "https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/81xxx/CVE-2026-81535.json"
}