Improper Handling of Alternate Encoding vulnerability in ash-project ash_double_entry allows an attacker to submit several distinct string spellings of the same identifier.
AshDoubleEntry.ULID renders a 128-bit ULID as 26 Crockford base-32 characters, but the first character encodes only 3 bits, so canonical values are 0 to 7. decode/1 in lib/ulid.ex masks the first character to its low 3 bits and valid?/1 accepts all 32 characters in that position, so 0..., 8..., G... and R... decode to the identical 16-byte value and resolve to the same row. When the type is exposed as a public ID over an HTTP or API boundary, an attacker-supplied ID can be spelled differently from the record it actually reads or writes, desynchronizing or bypassing string-level checks such as idempotency and deduplication keys, deny-lists, audit correlation, or signatures computed over the submitted ID.
This issue affects ash_double_entry: from 0.1.0 before 1.0.19.
{
"cna_assigner": "EEF",
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-173"
],
"osv_generated_from": "https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/81xxx/CVE-2026-81638.json",
"unresolved_ranges": [
{
"extracted_events": [
{
"introduced": "1e5f7ce8ff25f519c904731a29eb1258324e561a"
},
{
"fixed": "d3e688d300a581ae214b3ca7d95ef4de63fbb050"
}
],
"source": "AFFECTED_FIELD"
}
]
}