Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key vulnerability in ash-project ash_admin turns a record-lookup URL into an equality oracle over sensitive attributes.
AshAdmin.Helpers.decode_primary_key/2 decodes the composite-primary-key form (Base64 plus ETF) and returns the decoded map verbatim as the lookup filter, without checking that its keys are the resource's primary-key fields. The deserialization guards bound size, block new atoms and funs, and reject nested expressions, but none restricts which fields come back, and :safe still allows any already-interned attribute name. An attacker can therefore encode %{api_token: "guess"} and have it spliced into the lookup filter, brute-forcing a sensitive attribute value (API token, reset token) one equality guess at a time; Map.to_list/1 also accepts structs, yielding a bogus struct key. The fix rejects any decoded key that is not a real primary-key field.
This issue affects ash_admin: from 0.1.0 before 1.3.1.
{
"cna_assigner": "EEF",
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-639"
],
"osv_generated_from": "https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/81xxx/CVE-2026-81853.json",
"unresolved_ranges": [
{
"extracted_events": [
{
"introduced": "98b03baa8422b94dd13e305bf08b8ee3f7232c7b"
},
{
"fixed": "3c3e905d47f1155dcc1ca3fb347348b05a66065a"
}
],
"source": "AFFECTED_FIELD"
}
]
}