Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key vulnerability in ash-project ash_ai allows a caller of an identity-configured tool to update or destroy records it never identified, including every row in the table.
In AshAi.Tool.Execution, identityfilter/3 built the update/destroy filter directly from the raw tool arguments as [{key, Map.get(arguments, tostring(key))}] and passed it to Ash.Query.dofilter/2. A map value is parsed as a predicate expression rather than a literal, so a caller can send {"publicref": {"noteq": "<own-ref>"}} and, combined with Ash.Query.limit(1) and Ash.bulkupdate!/Ash.bulk_destroy!, retarget the write at a record it never identified; an omitted key yields an IS NULL filter that matches an arbitrary row. The fix casts each identity value to the field type, rejecting non-scalar inputs.
This issue affects ash_ai: from 0.6.0 before 1.0.0.
{
"osv_generated_from": "https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/82xxx/CVE-2026-82564.json",
"unresolved_ranges": [
{
"source": "AFFECTED_FIELD",
"extracted_events": [
{
"introduced": "bc2122f78fca6c11d8ec2b9ac53148ec17476460"
},
{
"fixed": "87f616d5bfbf7af43346f0701ae17f853789a602"
}
]
}
],
"cna_assigner": "EEF",
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-639"
]
}