Permissive Regular Expression vulnerability in ash-project ash_phoenix lets a remote client select the tenant an Ash application uses, or degrade the request, by sending a crafted Host header.
AshPhoenix.Helpers.get_subdomain/2 stripped the root domain with String.replace(host, ~r/.?#{root_host}/, ""). The root host was interpolated raw, so each . became a wildcard and any metacharacter a pattern, and the replace was global and unanchored, so a match was removed from anywhere in the string. With root_host example.com, Host: foo.exampleXcom.attacker.net returned the tenant foo.attacker.net. A metacharacter-bearing or nil root host degraded the pattern or raised on every request. The comparison was also case-sensitive, so TENANT.EXAMPLE.COM and EXAMPLE.COM slipped past the root-host allowlist. conn.host comes from the client Host header. The fix matches the root host case-insensitively and only as an exact trailing suffix.
This issue affects ash_phoenix: from 2.1.26 before 2.3.25.
{
"cna_assigner": "EEF",
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-178",
"CWE-625"
],
"osv_generated_from": "https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/82xxx/CVE-2026-82726.json",
"unresolved_ranges": [
{
"extracted_events": [
{
"introduced": "9a5ea4d377bc263de321d79574872a3dfc4fb541"
},
{
"fixed": "8306f29e77526840c89f3cd244996ce7c0fa2cda"
}
],
"source": "AFFECTED_FIELD"
}
]
}