Improper Validation of Unsafe Equivalence in Input in ZenHive mpp allows an unauthenticated remote client to pass the Tempo duplicate-submission gate twice with one signed transaction.
MPP.Methods.Tempo reserves the pre-broadcast dedup slot on the caller-supplied hex in reserve_hash_atomic/2, keyed through store_key/1 on tx.raw rather than on a canonical form of the transaction. The deserializer stores the caller's hex verbatim and accepts both recovery-id encodings, so one signed transaction submitted once with v=27 and once with v=0 yields two distinct reserve keys, and both pass the reserve and reach the broadcast path. The plug-level credential replay store is deliberately carved out for tempo in lib/mpp/replay.ex, leaving this reserve as the only gate, and the post-broadcast mark writes the canonical hash key that the raw-keyed reserve never reads.
What the duplicate submission yields depends on the node: a nonce-reuse rejection fails closed, while a node that answers with the canonical hash for an already-known transaction returns a second valid Payment-Receipt for a single on-chain payment.
This issue affects mpp: from 0.2.0 before 0.16.2.
{
"cna_assigner": "EEF",
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-1289"
],
"osv_generated_from": "https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/88xxx/CVE-2026-88255.json",
"unresolved_ranges": [
{
"extracted_events": [
{
"introduced": "f8904666061fbab695874856d8fcd02c471dfe1b"
},
{
"fixed": "e12bd4a1cea2e97c2a01fc059c48e5594a7b4a43"
}
],
"source": "AFFECTED_FIELD"
}
]
}