A certificate with no dNSName SAN but another SAN type present (e.g. registeredID or iPAddress) bypassed the Subject CN dNSName name-constraint check. The CN-as-DNS fallback was gated on cert->subjectCN != NULL && cert->altNames == NULL && !cert->isCA instead of "no dNSName SAN", so an out-of-scope CN was accepted. This incomplete fix from CVE-2026-6731, leading to the name-constraint check issue, was introduced in wolfSSL version 5.9.2.
{
"cna_assigner": "wolfSSL",
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-295"
],
"osv_generated_from": "https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/89xxx/CVE-2026-89134.json"
}{
"extracted_events": [
{
"range": [
{
"introduced": "5.9.2"
},
{
"last_affected": "5.9.2"
}
],
"source": "AFFECTED_FIELD",
"strategy": "StandaloneSingleVersion"
},
{
"cpe": "cpe:2.3:a:wolfssl:wolfssl:5.9.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"range": [
{
"introduced": "5.9.2"
},
{
"last_affected": "5.9.2"
}
],
"source": "CPE_STRING"
}
]
}