CVE-2026-89532

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

svcrdma: Fix pcl_for_each_segment for empty chunks

When a parsed chunk list contains a chunk whose ch_segcount is zero, pcl_for_each_segment computes its inclusive upper bound as &chunk->ch_segments[ch_segcount - 1]. ch_segcount is u32, so the subtraction wraps to 0xFFFFFFFF and the bound lands far past the ch_segments flex array. The loop body then walks unrelated memory at sizeof(struct svc_rdma_segment) stride until it faults.

A zero-segcount chunk is reachable from the wire: xdr_check_write_chunk() only rejects segcount values greater than rc_maxpages, and pcl_alloc_write() links a freshly allocated chunk onto rc_write_pcl/rc_reply_pcl before its segment-fill loop runs, so a Write or Reply chunk advertising zero segments leaves ch_segcount == 0 on the list. When the transport has negotiated Send-With-Invalidate, svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey() iterates all four PCLs with pcl_for_each_segment and dereferences segment->rs_handle on each iteration, turning the underflow into an out-of-bounds read and a general protection fault.

xdr_check_write_list / xdr_check_reply_chunk
  pcl_alloc_write()
    chunk = pcl_alloc_chunk(...)  /* ch_segcount = 0 */
    list_add_tail(&chunk->ch_list, &pcl->cl_chunks)
    /* fill loop iterates zero times for wire segcount 0 */

svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
  pcl_for_each_chunk(rc_write_pcl)
    pcl_for_each_segment(segment, chunk)
      pos <= &ch_segments[0u - 1u]  /* 0xFFFFFFFF */
      segment->rs_handle            /* OOB read -> GPF */

Fix by switching the macro to a half-open upper bound that uses ch_segcount directly. For ch_segcount == 0 the loop start equals the loop end and the body is skipped; for ch_segcount > 0 the iteration range is unchanged. All six existing call sites in net/sunrpc/xprtrdma/svc_rdma_recvfrom.c and net/sunrpc/xprtrdma/svc_rdma_rw.c remain correct under the new bound, so no caller changes are needed.