The Tauri updater plugin verifies update binaries using minisign signatures, but the signature covers only the raw binary bytes. The update manifest -- which contains the version number, download URL, and signature -- is fetched over TLS but is never itself signed or authenticated. Because the only anti-rollback check compares the manifest's version field against the current version, and that field is unsigned, an attacker who can serve a crafted manifest can force installation of any older signed release without possessing the developer's private key.
{
"cna_assigner": "JFROG",
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-354"
],
"osv_generated_from": "https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/95xxx/CVE-2026-95625.json",
"unresolved_ranges": [
{
"extracted_events": [
{
"introduced": "2.12.0"
},
{
"last_affected": "*"
}
],
"source": "AFFECTED_FIELD"
}
]
}