CVE-2026-97903

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

exit: hold a reference to thread_pid across proc_flush_pid

Commit 0a36bad01731 ("release_task: kill the no longer needed get/put_pid(thread_pid)") removed the reference around proc_flush_pid(). It assumed that free_pids(post.pids) at the end of release_task() would keep thread_pid alive until then.

That assumption is wrong. __change_pid() only records a detached PID in post.pids when pid_has_task() is false for every PIDTYPE. If another task still uses the exiting task's PID as its process group or session ID, __unhash_process() removes the exiting task's PIDTYPE_PID link but leaves the PID out of post.pids. release_task() therefore holds no reference to it after dropping tasklist_lock.

The other task can then remove the remaining PIDTYPE links. Its free_pids() call schedules delayed_put_pid(), and the RCU callback can free the PID before the first release_task() reaches proc_flush_pid().

An unprivileged reproducer races wait4(-1) against setsid() to trigger this ordering. Three of three fresh v7.2 KASAN boots reported:

BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in
proc_invalidate_siblings_dcache+0x3e2/0x3f0
Read of size 8 by task h7_pid_reaper/1921

Call Trace:
 proc_invalidate_siblings_dcache
 release_task
 wait_consider_task
 __do_wait
 do_wait
 kernel_wait4

Freed by task 0:
 kmem_cache_free
 put_pid
 delayed_put_pid
 rcu_core

Last potentially related work creation:
 __call_rcu_common
 free_pids
 ksys_setsid

KASAN identified a 144-byte object from the pid cache and located the bad read 80 bytes into the freed object, matching pid->inodes. With an explicit reference, three of three fresh boots completed without a KASAN report. The concurrent RCU callback dropped its reference while proc_flush_pid() was protected, and the balancing put_pid() performed the final free afterward.

Take a reference before __unhash_process() clears p->thread_pid and release it after proc_flush_pid() completes.

A tested source reproducer is available privately on request. No controlled read or write, information leak, or privilege escalation is claimed. The mainline patch applies directly to v6.19.y and newer; v6.16.y through v6.18.y need a context-adjusted backport.