In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ubifs: renamewhiteout: Fix double free for whiteoutui->data 'whiteoutui->data' will be freed twice if space budget fail for rename whiteout operation as following process: renamewhiteout dev = kmalloc whiteoutui->data = dev kfree(whiteoutui->data) // Free first time iput(whiteout) ubifsfreeinode kfree(ui->data) // Double free! KASAN reports: ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: double-free or invalid-free in ubifsfreeinode+0x4f/0x70 Call Trace: kfree+0x117/0x490 ubifsfreeinode+0x4f/0x70 [ubifs] icallback+0x30/0x60 rcudobatch+0x366/0xac0 _dosoftirq+0x133/0x57f Allocated by task 1506: kmemcachealloctrace+0x3c2/0x7a0 dorename+0x9b7/0x1150 [ubifs] ubifsrename+0x106/0x1f0 [ubifs] dosyscall64+0x35/0x80 Freed by task 1506: kfree+0x117/0x490 dorename.cold+0x53/0x8a [ubifs] ubifsrename+0x106/0x1f0 [ubifs] dosyscall64+0x35/0x80 The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88810238bed8 which belongs to the cache kmalloc-8 of size 8 ================================================================== Let ubifsfreeinode() free 'whiteoutui->data'. BTW, delete unused assignment 'whiteoutui->datalen = 0', process 'ubifsevictinode() -> ubifsjnldeleteinode() -> ubifsjnlwriteinode()' doesn't need it (because 'incnlink(whiteout)' won't be excuted by 'goto out_release', and the nlink of whiteout inode is 0).