In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ext4: refresh inline data size before write operations The cached ei->iinlinesize can become stale between the initial size check and when ext4updateinlinedata()/ext4createinlinedata() use it. Although ext4getmaxinlinesize() reads the correct value at the time of the check, concurrent xattr operations can modify iinlinesize before ext4writelockxattr() is acquired. This causes ext4updateinlinedata() and ext4createinlinedata() to work with stale capacity values, leading to a BUGON() crash in ext4writeinlinedata(): kernel BUG at fs/ext4/inline.c:1331! BUGON(pos + len > EXT4I(inode)->iinlinesize); The race window: 1. ext4getmaxinlinesize() reads iinlinesize = 60 (correct) 2. Size check passes for 50-byte write 3. [Another thread adds xattr, iinlinesize changes to 40] 4. ext4writelockxattr() acquires lock 5. ext4updateinlinedata() uses stale iinlinesize = 60 6. Attempts to write 50 bytes but only 40 bytes actually available 7. BUGON() triggers Fix this by recalculating iinlinesize via ext4findinlinedatanolock() immediately after acquiring xattrsem. This ensures ext4updateinlinedata() and ext4createinlinedata() work with current values that are protected from concurrent modifications. This is similar to commit a54c4613dac1 ("ext4: fix race writing to an inlinedata file while its xattrs are changing") which fixed iinlineoff staleness. This patch addresses the related iinlinesize staleness issue.