DEBIAN-CVE-2026-23316

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: ipv4: fix ARM64 alignment fault in multipath hash seed struct sysctl_fib_multipath_hash_seed contains two u32 fields (userseed and mpseed), making it an 8-byte structure with a 4-byte alignment requirement. In fib_multipath_hash_from_keys(), the code evaluates the entire struct atomically via READ_ONCE(): mpseed = READONCE(net->ipv4.sysctlfibmultipathhashseed).mpseed; While this silently works on GCC by falling back to unaligned regular loads which the ARM64 kernel tolerates, it causes a fatal kernel panic when compiled with Clang and LTO enabled. Commit e35123d83ee3 ("arm64: lto: Strengthen READONCE() to acquire when CONFIG_LTO=y") strengthens READ_ONCE() to use Load-Acquire instructions (ldar / ldapr) to prevent compiler reordering bugs under Clang LTO. Since the macro evaluates the full 8-byte struct, Clang emits a 64-bit ldar instruction. ARM64 architecture strictly requires ldar to be naturally aligned, thus executing it on a 4-byte aligned address triggers a strict Alignment Fault (FSC = 0x21). Fix the read side by moving the READ_ONCE() directly to the u32 member, which emits a safe 32-bit ldar Wn. Furthermore, Eric Dumazet pointed out that WRITE_ONCE() on the entire struct in proc_fib_multipath_hash_set_seed() is also flawed. Analysis shows that Clang splits this 8-byte write into two separate 32-bit str instructions. While this avoids an alignment fault, it destroys atomicity and exposes a tear-write vulnerability. Fix this by explicitly splitting the write into two 32-bit WRITE_ONCE() operations. Finally, add the missing READ_ONCE() when reading user_seed in proc_fib_multipath_hash_seed() to ensure proper pairing and concurrency safety.