DHI-wo3n-ilc6-3hzw-rotx

Source
https://scout.docker.com/v/DHI-wo3n-ilc6-3hzw-rotx
Import Source
https://github.com/docker-hardened-images/advisories/blob/main/dhi/osv/2026/DHI-wo3n-ilc6-3hzw-rotx.json
JSON Data
https://api.osv.dev/v1/vulns/DHI-wo3n-ilc6-3hzw-rotx
Upstream
Published
2026-11-12T23:57:09Z
Modified
2026-11-21T14:30:32Z
Severity
  • 8.6 (High) CVSS_V3 - CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H CVSS Calculator
Summary
## Summary
Details

Summary

Dulwich's porcelain.checkout(paths=[...]) code path writes files using raw os.open(file_path, O_WRONLY|O_CREAT|O_TRUNC, mode) followed by f.write(obj.data). This code path does NOT call build_file_from_blob() at all, completely bypassing any symlink protections (including the unreleased d09f8af fix). os.open without O_NOFOLLOW follows symlinks at both the target file and intermediate directories, allowing arbitrary file writes.

Root Cause

At dulwich/porcelain/__init__.py:5661-5675, the checkout(paths=[...]) implementation:

file_path = _checked_worktree_path(r, path)
os.makedirs(os.path.dirname(file_path), exist_ok=True)
flags = os.O_WRONLY | os.O_CREAT | os.O_TRUNC
with os.fdopen(os.open(file_path, flags, mode), "wb") as f:
    f.write(obj.data)

_checked_worktree_path() (line 601-631) only performs name validation — checking that the path doesn't start with / or \\ and that components pass INVALID_DOTNAMES checks. It performs zero filesystem symlink detection.

Impact

An attacker can craft a malicious repository that, when a victim clones it and runs checkout(paths=[...]), writes attacker-controlled content (with attacker-controlled permissions) to any filesystem location accessible to the user. Writing to .git/hooks/post-checkout achieves RCE on the next git checkout.

Attack Scenario

  1. Attacker creates a repository where HEAD has trigger as a symlink (mode 120000, content ../../.git/hooks/post-checkout), and tag v1.0 has trigger as an executable file (mode 100755, content #!/bin/sh\nmalicious_payload)
  2. Victim clones the repository — worktree has trigger → ../../.git/hooks/post-checkout (a symlink)
  3. Victim runs porcelain.checkout(repo, target="v1.0", paths=["trigger"]) to restore a specific file from a tag
  4. _checked_worktree_path(r, "trigger") passes — name validation only, no symlink check
  5. os.open("trigger", O_WRONLY|O_CREAT|O_TRUNC, 0o755) follows the symlink → opens .git/hooks/post-checkout for writing
  6. f.write(obj.data) writes the malicious payload to the hook
  7. Next checkout operation triggers the hook → RCE

Suggested Fix

Replace the raw os.open path with a call to build_file_from_blob (once that function is hardened against intermediate symlinks), or add explicit symlink detection: resolve the path with os.path.realpath() and verify it stays within the worktree root before opening.

Reported by zx (Jace)

References

Affected packages

Docker Hardened Images:Debian:13 / netbox

Package

Name
netbox
Purl
pkg:deb/dhi/netbox

Affected ranges

Affected versions

4.*
4.6.7-0
4.6.8-0
4.6.8-1
4.6.8-2
4.6.8-3
4.6.9-0
4.6.9-1
4.6.9-2
4.6.10-0
4.6.10-1
4.7.1-0
4.7.1-1
4.7.1-2
4.7.1-3
4.7.1-4
4.7.1-5
4.7.1-6
4.7.2-0
4.7.2-1
4.7.2-2
4.7.2-3
4.7.2-4
4.7.3-0
4.7.3-1
4.7.3-2
4.7.3-3
4.7.3-4
4.7.4-0
4.7.4-1
4.7.4-2
4.7.4-3
4.7.4-4
4.7.4-5
4.7.4-6
4.7.5-0
4.7.5-1
4.7.5-2

Database specific

owner_kind
"HSP"
source
"https://github.com/docker-hardened-images/advisories/blob/main/dhi/osv/2026/DHI-wo3n-ilc6-3hzw-rotx.json"