EEF-CVE-2026-109584

Summary

Improper Handling of Highly Compressed Data (Data Amplification) vulnerability in the HTTP/2 implementation of mtrudel bandit allows an unauthenticated remote attacker to exhaust server memory via a small HPACK-compressed HEADERS block. The block stores one large cookie value in the HPACK dynamic table and then references it tens of thousands of times with 1-byte indexed fields. In the reporter's run, a 49 KB block made a server with default settings allocate a 183 MB cookie binary before any application code ran, and every concurrent stream can repeat the cost.

Bandit.HTTP2.Connection caps only the compressed block (max_header_block_size), and its check of the decoded list against max_header_list_size never fires because that setting defaults to :infinity. combine_cookie_crumbs/1 in lib/bandit/http2/stream.ex then joins every crumb into one binary.

This issue affects bandit: from 0.3.3 before 1.14.0.

Details

1. Compression

The attacker's header block, split across HEADERS and CONTINUATION frames, stays under the 50,000-byte max_header_block_size. It inserts one 4,058-byte cookie into the 4,096-byte dynamic table, the largest value that fits, then references it about 45,000 times with 1-byte indexed representations. HPAX.decode returns a list whose entries all point at the same binary, so decoding itself stays cheap.

2. Missing decoded limit (lib/bandit/http2/connection.ex, lib/bandit/http2/settings.ex)

After decoding, the connection compares header_list_size(headers) against local_settings.max_header_list_size. That setting defaults to :infinity, and in Erlang term order every integer sorts below an atom, so the comparison never rejects a list. The limit is enforced only when an operator sets it.

3. Expansion (lib/bandit/http2/stream.ex)

read_headers calls combine_cookie_crumbs/1, which joins every crumb with Enum.map_join/3 into a single binary of about 183 MB before Plug.call/2 runs. max_concurrent_streams also defaults to :infinity, so N streams allocate N times as much.

Proof of concept

1. Against a Bandit server with default HTTP/2 settings, build an HPACK header block with the request pseudo-headers plus a 4,058-byte cookie stored in the dynamic table and then referenced about 45,000 times with indexed representations. The block is about 49 KB.
2. Send it on one stream as a HEADERS frame followed by CONTINUATION frames of at most 16,384 bytes, with END_HEADERS on the last.
3. The request reaches the plug with a cookie header of about 183 MB, and VM memory grows by about the same amount. Repeat on further streams to multiply it.

Impact

An unauthenticated remote client can make any Bandit server with default HTTP/2 settings allocate a cookie binary thousands of times larger than the header block it sent, before any application code runs. Repeating it across concurrent streams exhausts the BEAM node's memory, taking down every application on the node.

Workarounds

On 1.12.2 and later, set a finite decoded header list limit, for example http_2_options: [default_local_settings: [max_header_list_size: 65_536]], which resets the stream before the cookie crumbs are joined. From 0.7.0, disabling HTTP/2 with http_2_options: [enabled: false] removes the vulnerable path.