Inefficient Algorithmic Complexity vulnerability in benoitc idna allows an attacker who controls a hostname passed to the library to exhaust CPU via an over-long xn-- label. idna:ulabel/1 in src/idna.erl hands every ASCII label that starts with xn-- to punycode:decode/1 without applying check_label_length/1, the 63-octet DNS label limit. punycode:decode/1 in src/punycode.erl builds its output with list appends in insert/4, so its cost grows super-linearly with the label length. A label of a few kilobytes keeps a scheduler busy for seconds to minutes before the label is rejected as invalid punycode.
Every decode entry point reaches this path: decode/1, decode/2, to_unicode/1 and from_ascii/1. The encode path reaches it as well, because alabel/1 calls ulabel/1 on an ASCII xn-- label before its own length check, so encode/1, encode/2 and to_ascii/1 are affected for such input.
This issue affects idna: from 0.5.0 before 8.0.0.
1. Label dispatch. idna:decode/2 in src/idna.erl lowercases the domain, splits it into labels and passes each one to ulabel/1. For an all-ASCII label that starts with xn--, ulabel/1 strips the prefix and calls punycode:decode/1 on the remainder. No length check runs before that call. check_label_length/1, which rejects labels longer than 63 octets, is only called from alabel/1, and there only after alabel/1 has itself called ulabel/1 on an ASCII label.
2. Super-linear decoding. punycode:decode/1 in src/punycode.erl decodes one code point per delta and places it into the output with insert/4. insert/4 walks to the insertion index by rebuilding the head with Head ++ [C] on every step and then appends the tail with another ++. Each insertion therefore costs time quadratic in the insertion index, and the total work grows roughly with the cube of the label length. The reporter measured about an 8x increase in running time per doubling of the label.
3. Work before rejection. The crafted label is not valid punycode and the call eventually exits with an error, but only after the decoder has processed the whole label. The ?MAX overflow guards in punycode:decode/1 cover the RFC 3492 integer overflow class and do not bound the running time.
4. Entry points. decode/1, decode/2, to_unicode/1 and from_ascii/1 reach ulabel/1 in every affected release. From 6.0.0, alabel/1 calls ulabel/1 on any ASCII label that starts with xn-- before check_label_length/1, so encode/1, encode/2, to_ascii/1 and utf8_to_ascii/1 reach the decoder for such input as well.
xn-- followed by several thousand a characters and the digits 99.idna:decode/1 on it and measure the call with timer:tc/1.An attacker who can get an application to decode or encode a hostname they control, for example from a user-supplied URL or a redirect Location header, keeps one scheduler busy per call for seconds to hours depending on the label length. Enough concurrent calls exhaust the CPU of the VM.
Before passing a hostname to idna, reject any domain that contains a label longer than 63 octets. The DNS limits labels to that length, so legitimate names pass unchanged, and the decoder never runs on the crafted label. The check must run before every call that reaches idna:ulabel/1, including encode/1 and to_ascii/1, because alabel/1 decodes an ASCII xn-- label before checking its length.
{
"capec_ids": [
"CAPEC-130"
],
"cpe_ids": [
"cpe:2.3:a:benoitc:idna:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*"
],
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-407"
]
}