Symlink following vulnerability in Gleam's Hex package export allows files outside the project root to be embedded in the generated package tarball.
The file collection helpers (gleam_files, native_files, private_files) in compiler-cli/src/fs.rs use follow_links(true) when walking publishable directories such as src/ and priv/. The collected paths are added to the package archive via add_path_to_tar in compiler-cli/src/publish.rs without verifying that the resolved target remains within the project root. A symlink placed under a publishable directory will cause gleam export hex-tarball or gleam publish to embed the contents of the symlink target into the generated Hex package.
An attacker with write access to the project repository can place a symlink in src/ or priv/ pointing to an arbitrary file. When a maintainer or CI pipeline runs gleam publish or gleam export hex-tarball, local files readable by the publisher (such as secrets, tokens, or SSH keys) are silently embedded into the published package artifact.
This issue affects Gleam from 0.10.0-rc1 until 1.17.0.
* Avoid running gleam publish or gleam export hex-tarball on untrusted projects * Review the contents of src/ and priv/ for unexpected symlinks before publishing * Run publishing commands in a restricted or isolated environment (e.g. containers)
{
"capec_ids": [
"CAPEC-132"
],
"cpe_ids": [
"cpe:2.3:a:gleam-lang:gleam:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*"
],
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-59"
]
}