HistoryTreeProof::verify panics on a malformed proof where history.len() != positions.len() due to assert_eq!(history.len(), positions.len()).
The proof object is derived from untrusted p2p responses (ResponseTransactionsProof.proof) and is therefore attacker-controlled at the network boundary until validated. A malicious peer could trigger a crash by returning a crafted inclusion proof with a length mismatch.
The patch for this vulnerability is included as part of v1.3.0.
No known workarounds know.
{
"nvd_published_at": "2026-04-22T21:17:07Z",
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-617"
],
"severity": "LOW",
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-22T19:20:50Z"
}