A malicious network peer can crash any Nimiq full node by publishing a crafted Kademlia DHT record containing a TaggedSigned<ValidatorRecord, KeyPair> with a signature field whose byte length is not exactly 64. When the victim node's DHT verifier calls TaggedSigned::verify, execution reaches Ed25519Signature::from_bytes(sig).unwrap() in the TaggedPublicKey implementation for Ed25519PublicKey. The from_bytes call fails because ed25519_zebra::Signature::try_from rejects slices not 64 bytes, and the unwrap() panics. The BLS TaggedPublicKey implementation correctly returns false on error; only the Ed25519 implementation panics.
The patch for this vulnerability is formally released as part of v1.4.0.
No known workarounds.
See PR.
{
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-15T16:31:22Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-252"
],
"severity": "HIGH",
"github_reviewed": true
}